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BLACKBURN LIMITED PARTNERSHIP v. PAUL: THE BIRTH OF 
MARYLAND’S STATUTE OR ORDINANCE RULE AND ITS ILL-
DEFINED “TARGETED CLASS” REQUIREMENT 
MONICA BASCHE∗ 
In Blackburn Limited Partnership v. Paul,1 the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals considered a premises liability case in which a young boy nearly 
drowned in an apartment complex’s pool.2  The court applied a rule unique 
to Maryland, the Statute or Ordinance Rule, largely as a result of their re-
luctance to change the common law.3  Though ultimately arriving at the 
right result, the court’s misreading of Maryland’s traditional rule governing 
negligence claims arising from statutory violations4 led it to erroneously 
maintain two conflicting rules.5  The court failed to consider that maintain-
ing contradictory rules governing the effects of the violation of a statute or 
ordinance could lead to inconsistent and unpredictable results.6  The court 
also erred in failing to provide clear guidelines for when a statute, ordi-
nance, or regulation protects a more “targeted class” of persons, one of the 
Statute or Ordinance Rule’s requirements.7  The Court of Appeals should 
have provided clear guidelines for the Statute or Ordinance Rule’s “targeted 
class” requirement.8  The court should also have expressly acknowledged 
that it was changing its handling of negligence claims arising from statutory 
violations.9  Taking these two steps would have allowed Maryland’s Gen-
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 1.  438 Md. 100, 90 A.3d 464 (2014). 
 2.  Id. at 104, 90 A.3d at 466. 
 3.  Id. at 125–26, 90 A.3d at 478–79.  A Westlaw search for “Statute or Ordinance Rule” 
returns two Maryland cases using the term: Blackburn Limited. Partnership v. Paul, id., and Po-
lakoff v. Turner, 385 Md. 467, 476, 869 A.2d 837, 843 (2005). 
 4.  When this Note uses the term “statutory violation” it encompasses violations of statutes, 
ordinances, and regulations.   
 5.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 6.  See infra Part IV.C.1. 
 7.  See infra Part IV.B.  In the interest of brevity, this Note will refer to the Statute or Ordi-
nance Rule’s requirement that a statute, ordinance or regulation “aims to protect a more targeted 
class of persons” as the “targeted class” requirement.  Blackburn, 438 Md. at 114, 90 A.3d at 472.  
 8.  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 9.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 622 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 74:621 
eral Assembly to draft legislation accordingly and would have allowed 
plaintiffs and defendants to better predict when a statute will be used to im-
pose civil liability.10 
I.  THE CASE 
On June 11, 2010, three-year-old Christopher Paul and his ten-year-old 
brother, Andre, were playing outdoors at Country Place Apartments.11  The 
brothers had gone in and out of the apartment three times when Andre no-
ticed that his younger brother was missing.12  Andre told his mother, Alicia 
Paul, and they went to look for Christopher.13  After searching around the 
apartment complex and the cars in the parking lot, they made their way to-
wards the apartment complex’s swimming pool.14 
Although the pool was not yet open, when Ms. Paul approached the 
gate, she saw Christopher’s discarded shoes and clothing through the 
fence.15  The pool’s manager and a lifeguard arrived just moments before to 
open the pool for the day.16  After opening the pool’s gate, Ms. Paul and the 
pool employees found Christopher floating in the water.17  The lifeguard 
pulled Christopher from the water and, upon checking his vital signs, dis-
covered that he was “not breathing and did not have a pulse.”18  After call-
ing for an ambulance, the pool’s manager and lifeguard attempted to resus-
citate Christopher.19  Paramedics eventually arrived and took over the 
rescue efforts.20  They transported Christopher to Howard County General 
Hospital and he was subsequently transferred to Children’s National Medi-
cal Center in Washington, D.C. for acute care.21  Doctors determined that 
Christopher had “suffered a severe anoxic brain injury.”22 
                                                          
 10.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 11.  Blackburn, 438 Md. at 104, 90 A.3d at 466.  Country Place Apartments is the apartment 
complex where Christopher and Andre’s parents resided in Burtonsville, Maryland.  Id.  
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Paul v. Blackburn Ltd. P’ship, 211 Md. App. 52, 59, 63 A.3d 1107, 1112 (2013), aff’d, 
438 Md. 100, 90 A.3d 464 (2014). 
 15.  Id. at 59–60, 63 A.3d at 1112. 
 16.  Id. at 60, 63 A.3d at 1112. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id.  There is a discrepancy between the Court of Special Appeals decision and the Court 
of Appeals decision regarding who called 911.  The Court of Appeals states: “The lifeguards be-
gan CPR while Respondent spoke to a 911 operator.”  Blackburn Ltd. P’ship v. Paul, 438 Md. 
100, 104, 90 A.3d 464, 466 (2014).  The Court of Special Appeals states: “[The pool manager] 
called 911.”  Paul, 211 Md. App. at 60, 63 A.3d at 1112. 
 20.  Blackburn, 438 Md. at 104, 90 A.3d at 466. 
 21.  Paul, 211 Md. App. at 60, 63 A.3d at 1112. 
 22.  Id.  Christopher now has impaired vision and motor skills and requires near constant 
medical care.  Id.  
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On December 17, 2010, Alicia Paul filed a complaint on behalf of 
Christopher against Blackburn Limited Partnership (“Blackburn”), Berk-
shire Property Advisors, LLC, and Community Pool Services in Baltimore 
City Circuit Court.23  The complaint alleged negligence, negligence per se 
for the violation of Maryland’s pool safety regulations, and requested com-
pensation for Christopher’s $15,000,000 in medical expenses.24 
Blackburn filed a motion for summary judgment with regard to all of 
the claims.25  Blackburn argued that it owed no affirmative duty of care to 
Christopher because he was a trespasser.26  Therefore, Maryland’s pool 
safety regulations did not create a duty of care above the limited common-
law duty owed to trespassers.27  The trial court agreed with Blackburn’s ar-
gument and granted its motion for summary judgment.28  As to the negli-
gence per se claim,29 a negligence claim in which the court adopts a statute, 
ordinance, or regulation as the standard of care, the trial court concluded 
that the regulations did not apply to Blackburn’s pool.30  The court reasoned 
that the pool was constructed before February 10, 1997, the date the regula-
tions came into force, and therefore the regulations did not impose a statuto-
ry duty on Blackburn.31  The trial court also concluded that there was no ev-
idence showing how Christopher gained access to the pool;32 therefore, the 
case was dismissed.33 
                                                          
 23.  Blackburn, 438 Md. at 105, 90 A.3d at 466–67.  Blackburn owns Country Place Apart-
ments.  Id.  The lawsuit initially named “Second Blackburn Limited Partnership” as the owners of 
Country Place Apartments.  Id.  Second Blackburn was the owner at the time of Christopher’s ac-
cident.  Id. at 105 n.1, 90 A.3d at 466 n.1.  On November 8, 2011, the parties stipulated to the fact 
that Blackburn Limited Partnership was the owner of the apartment complex, and that it should be 
substituted for Second Blackburn.  Id. at 105 n.4, 90 A.3d at 467 n.4.  Berkshire Property Advisers 
(“Berkshire”) managed the apartment complex and Community Pool Services managed the pool.  
Id. at 105 nn.2–3, 90 A.3d at 466 nn.2–3.  
 24.  Id. at 105, 90 A.3d at 467.  On March 18, 2011, the case was moved to the Circuit Court 
of Montgomery County.  Paul, 211 Md. App. at 62 n.8, 63 A.3d at 1113 n.8. 
 25.  Blackburn, 438 Md. at 105, 90 A.3d at 467.  Berkshire was a party to Blackburn’s sum-
mary judgment motion.  Id.  Community Pool Services also filed a motion for summary judgment, 
arguing that by virtue of being Blackburn’s agent, it could only be held to the same duty of care as 
Blackburn.  Id. 
 26.  Id. at 105–06, 90 A.3d at 467. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. at 106, 90 A.3d at 467.  The trial court found that Christopher was no longer an in-
vitee when he entered the pool area, but a trespasser, and the defendants owed no affirmative duty 
of care to him under Maryland law.  Id.   
 29.  See infra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 30.  Blackburn, 438 Md. at 106, 90 A.3d at 467.   
 31.  Id.  The Maryland public swimming pool regulations went into effect on February 10, 
1997.  Id. at 117, 90 A.3d at 474.  Ms. Paul called the claim against Blackburn for its alleged vio-
lation of the pool safety regulations “negligence per se,” id. at 105, 90 A.3d at 467, which is an 
imprecise use of the term.  See infra note 74. 
 32.  Blackburn, 438 Md. at 106, 90 A.3d at 467. 
 33.  Id. 
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On appeal, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals reversed the circuit 
court’s ruling.34  The court held that the defendants owed Christopher a du-
ty of care even though he was a trespasser.35  With respect to the 1997 pool 
safety regulations, the appellate court also reversed the trial court’s holding 
that the regulations did not apply to the Country Place Apartments’ pool.36  
The Court of Special Appeals applied the four-part test for when a standard 
of conduct may be determined by legislation or regulation from the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts § 286.37  The court determined that the pool 
safety regulations satisfied all four parts; therefore, it adopted the standard 
of care set forth in the regulations.38  The court concluded that the regula-
tions created an action in tort for the pool-going public.39  The court then 
determined that a violation of the pool safety regulations may constitute ev-
idence of negligence despite Christopher’s status as a trespasser.40  The 
Court of Special Appeals also found that the trial court erred when it con-
cluded that Alicia Paul had to present direct evidence of proximate cause; 
rather, circumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish proximate cause in 
order make out a prima facie case of negligence.41 
                                                          
 34.  Paul v. Blackburn Ltd. P’ship, 211 Md. App. 52, 55, 63 A.3d 1107, 1110 (2013), aff’d, 
438 Md. 100, 90 A.3d 464 (2014). 
 35.  Id. at 98, 63 A.3d at 1134. 
 36.  Id. at 105–06, 63 A.3d at 1139.  Interpreting the intent of COMAR 10.17.01–.54, the ap-
pellate court found that the regulations were enacted to protect the health and safety of the pool-
going public and the barrier provisions were enacted specifically to prevent children from access-
ing pools, thus minimizing potential accidental drownings and near drownings.  Id. at 103, 63 
A.3d at 1137. 
 37.  Id. at 106–07, 63 A.3d at 1139.   
 38.  Id.  Applying the criteria from Restatement (Second) of Torts § 286, the Court of Special 
Appeals found that the Maryland pool safety regulations are meant to protect: (1) a class of per-
sons including the one whose interest was invaded—the swimming public; (2) the particular inter-
est invaded—that is, the health and safety of the swimming public; (3) the interest against the kind 
of harm which resulted—drownings and near drownings; and (4) the interest against the particular 
hazard from which the harm results—the construction of suitable barriers to protect against 
drownings and near drownings.  Id.  
 39.  Id. at 108, 63 A.3d at 1140.  The Court of Special Appeals decided the case more broadly 
than the Court of Appeals.  It based its finding that COMAR 10.17.01.21 (the barrier provisions of 
the pool safety regulations) created a standard of care on the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§§ 286 and 288.  Id. at 106–07, 63 A.3d at 1139.  
 40.  Id. at 109, 63 A.3d at 1141.  The Court of Special Appeals applied the two-part test from 
Joseph v. Bozzuto Management Co.: (1) the injury is of the type that the statute or regulation is 
designed to prevent, and (2) the plaintiff must be a member of the class the statute or regulation 
was designed to protect.  173 Md. App. 305, 321–22, 918 A.2d 1230, 1239 (2007).  The court de-
termined that Blackburn potentially violated the regulation requiring a no greater than four-inch 
opening in a pool barrier when its gate was closed, that Christopher’s near drowning was the type 
of injury that the regulation was enacted to prevent, and that Christopher was a member of the 
class of persons that the regulation was designed to protect.  Paul, 211 Md. App. at 108–09, 63 
A.3d at 1140–41. 
 41.  Id. at 110, 63 A.3d at 1141.  Circumstantial evidence that Christopher gained access to 
the pool through the allegedly faulty gate would be sufficient to establish proximate causation and 
thus survive a motion for summary judgment.  Id. at 111–12, 63 A.3d at 1142.  While acknowl-
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Blackburn appealed the ruling to the Court of Appeals.42  The court 
granted certiorari43 to consider whether the Court of Special Appeals: (1) 
abrogated Maryland common law that property owners owe no duty of care 
to trespassers, (2) erred in concluding that evidence of violation of a regula-
tion may create a duty from a property owner to a trespasser, and (3) im-
properly concluded that the 1997 Maryland Pool Safety Regulations apply 
to Blackburn’s pool.44 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
In some negligence cases, a court adopts the standard of care set forth 
in a statute such that the violation of a statute is considered negligence, ab-
sent an excuse.45  This is formally known as negligence per se.46  Maryland 
has consistently declined to adopt negligence per se, instead regarding the 
violation of a statute or ordinance as only evidence of negligence.47  Recent 
jurisprudence, however, shows that the Maryland Court of Appeals has 
moved away from its long-held position.48  Maryland now has two incon-
sistent but overlapping rules governing negligence claims arising out of the 
violation of a statute, ordinance, or regulation.49  The first, which declines 
to impose a statutory duty unless there is a pre-existing common-law duty, 
originated in a 1932 Maryland Court of Appeals decision, State v. Longe-
ley.50  Under the Longeley rule, if a duty exists at common law, a statute can 
set the standard of care; if no common-law duty exists, the case is dis-
missed.51  The other rule, known as the Statute or Ordinance Rule, emerged 
over seventy years later in Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc.52  It uses a stat-
ute to impose a duty when no duty exists at common law.53 
The Statute or Ordinance Rule examines the statute to determine 
whether it was intended to protect a specific class of persons from a particu-
                                                          
edging that there was no direct evidence of causation, the Court of Special Appeals found that suf-
ficient evidence existed for the trier of fact to conclude that Christopher had gained access to the 
pool through a faulty gate.  Id.  See infra note 61 for Maryland’s definition of proximate causa-
tion.  
 42.  Blackburn Ltd. P’ship v. Paul, 438 Md. 100, 107, 90 A.3d 464, 468 (2014). 
 43.  Blackburn Ltd. P’ship v. Paul, 432 Md. 466, 69 A.3d 474 (2013). 
 44.  Blackburn, 438 Md. at 107, 90 A.3d at 468. 
 45.  See infra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 46.  See infra note 70 and accompanying text.  
 47.  See infra Part II.A. 
 48.  See infra Part II.C. 
 49.  See infra Parts II.B–C. 
 50.  161 Md. 563, 569, 158 A. 6, 8 (1932). 
 51.  See infra Part II.B. 
 52.  378 Md. 70, 835 A.2d 616 (2003). 
 53.  See infra Part II.C.  
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lar type of injury.54  If the statute in question meets these requirements, then 
the statute operates to impose a duty and set a standard of care in a negli-
gence action.55  Typically, if the defendant does not owe the plaintiff a duty 
at common law, the defendant cannot be held liable for negligence and the 
plaintiff’s case is dismissed.56  If the Statute or Ordinance Rule applies, 
however, the statute imposes a duty on the defendant,57 and the plaintiff’s 
case, which would otherwise fail, may proceed to trial.58  In addition, the 
Statute or Ordinance Rule differs from Maryland’s traditional rule govern-
ing the violation of a statute or ordinance in one crucial respect: it provides 
that the defendant’s violation of a statute is prima facie evidence of negli-
gence, not mere evidence of negligence.59  Therefore, if the statute satisfies 
the Statute or Ordinance Rule, the burden is then on the defendant to pro-
vide evidence that she was not negligent.60  These rules provide the basis 
for the court’s decision in Blackburn. 
A.  Negligence Claims Arising out of a Statutory Violation 
Negligence is the failure to exercise reasonable care under the circum-
stances.61  Reasonable care is measured by what a reasonably prudent per-
                                                          
 54.  See, e.g., Brooks, 378 Md. at 81–84, 835 A.2d at 622–24 (interpreting Baltimore City 
Housing Code provisions). 
 55.  Id. at 78, 835 A.2d at 620–21 (citing Brown v. Dermer 357 Md. 344, 358, 744 A.2d 47, 
55 (2000), overruled in part on other grounds by Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc., 378 Md. 70, 
72, 835 A.2d 616, 617 (2003)). 
 56.  See State v. Longeley, 161 Md. 563, 570, 158 A. 6, 8 (1932) (dismissing case, in part, 
because landowner only owed a duty to refrain from willfully injuring a trespassing child who had 
drowned on his property). 
 57.  See Brooks, 378 Md. at 81, 835 A.2d at 622 (holding that the Baltimore City Housing 
Code “imposes numerous duties and obligations upon landlords who rent residential property to 
tenants”). 
 58.  See id. at 89, 835 A.2d at 627 (remanding case for new trial of negligence claim based on 
landlord’s alleged violation of housing code).  
 59.  Compare id. at 79, 835 A.2d at 621 (discussing how a plaintiff establishes a prima facie 
case of negligence based on a statutory violation), with Brown v. Dermer, 357 Md. 344, 358, 744 
A.2d 47, 55 (2000) (“It is well-settled that the violation of a statute may furnish evidence of negli-
gence.”). 
 60.  See Polakoff v. Turner, 385 Md. 467, 484, 869 A.2d 837, 847 (2005) (noting that plaintiff 
had met her burden of production by establishing that defendant landlord had violated the housing 
code); see also Brooks, 378 Md. at 85, 835 A.2d at 624 (noting that whether defendant is held lia-
ble for a statutory violation “will depend on the jury’s evaluation of the reasonableness of [de-
fendant]’s actions under all the circumstances”). 
 61.  E.g., Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., (1856) 156 Eng. Rep. 1047, 1049; 11 Ex. 
Rep. 781, 784 (Alderson, B.); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM 
§ 3 (2010) (defining negligence).  The Maryland Civil Pattern Jury Instructions define negligence 
as “doing something that a person using reasonable care would not do, or not doing something that 
a person using reasonable care would do.”  MPJI-Cv 19:1.  In Maryland, in order to establish a 
negligence claim, the plaintiff must plead and prove: (a) A duty “requiring conformance to a cer-
tain standard of conduct for the protection of others against unreasonable risks”; (b) breach of du-
ty, that is, “[f]ailure to conform to that standard”; (c) proximate cause, that is, “[r]easonably close 
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son would have done under the same or similar circumstances.62  Under cer-
tain circumstances, a court may adopt a standard of conduct set forth in a 
statute, ordinance, or regulation.63  This is true even if the legislative en-
actment does not expressly or impliedly provide for civil liability.64  These 
circumstances typically involve a statute, ordinance, or regulation designed 
to protect a specific class of persons from a particular type of injury.65 
Depending on the jurisdiction, the violation of a statute, ordinance, or 
regulation may have different procedural effects and create different roles 
for the judge and the jury.66  In a substantial majority of jurisdictions, when 
the court adopts a statutory standard of care, the violation of the statute is 
considered negligence as a matter of law (negligence per se) or it creates a 
rebuttable presumption of negligence.67  In a minority of jurisdictions, the 
violation of a statute is merely evidence of negligence.68  Regardless of the 
procedural effects, the judge always decides the duty question just like in 
any other case of negligence.69 
                                                          
casual connection and resulting injury”; and (d) damages or loss.  B.N. v. K.K., 312 Md. 135, 141, 
538 A.2d 1175, 1178 (1988) (citing W.P. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS, 164–65 (5th ed. 1984)). 
 62.  E.g., Gossett v. Jackson, 457 S.E.2d 97, 100 (Va. 1995).  
 63.  See Ferrell v. Baxter, 484 P.2d 250, 257–58 (Alaska 1971) (administrative regulation); 
Stephens v. Stearns, 678 P.2d 41, 49 (Idaho 1984) (city ordinance); Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 
814, 815 (N.Y. 1920) (statute). 
 64.  Martin, 126 N.E. at 815 (adopting statutory standard of conduct in negligence action that 
required drivers to have functioning headlights on their vehicles); see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 285 cmt. c (1965) (discussing fact that a court may adopt a statutory stand-
ard of conduct “[e]ven where a legislative enactment contains no express provision that its viola-
tion shall result in tort liability, and no implication to that effect”).  
 65.  See, e.g., Ferrell, 484 P.2d at 261 (concluding that regulation that required drivers to stay 
within their lanes was “at least partly designed to protect oncoming motorists against head-on col-
lisions”). 
 66.  Compare Martin, 126 N.E. 814 at 815 (discussing procedural effects of negligence per 
se), with Bacon v. Lascelles, 678 A.2d 902, 907 (Vt. 1996) (noting procedural effects of rebuttable 
presumption of negligence based on violation of statute), and Braitman v. Overlook Terrace 
Corp., 346 A.2d 76, 85 (N.J. 1975) (noting that the violation of a statute “is a circumstance which 
the trier of fact should consider in assessing liability”). 
 67.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 14, Reporter’s Note, cmt. 
c (2010).  The only substantial difference between the negligence per se and the rebuttable pre-
sumption forms is that negligence per se confines the defendant’s potential excuses to those enu-
merated in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288A or Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for 
Physical & Emotional Harm § 15, whereas the rebuttable presumption version does not confine 
the defendant to these excuses.  See Zeni v. Anderson, 243 N.W.2d 270, 283 (Mich. 1976) (ex-
plaining the difference between procedural effects of negligence per se and rebuttable presump-
tion forms). 
 68.  E.g., Absolon v. Dollahite, 376 Md. 547, 553, 831 A.2d 6, 9 (2003); Braitman, 346 A.2d 
at 85; Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591, 600–01 (Utah 1982). 
 69.  Compare Tafoya v. Rael, 193 P.3d 551, 554 (N.M. 2008) (“[T]he existence of a tort du-
ty . . . is a question of law for the courts.”), with Schlimmer v. Poverty Hunt Club, 597 S.E.2d 43, 
46 (Va. 2004) (“The first two elements of negligence per se, whether the statute was enacted for 
public safety and whether the injured party was a member of the class of people for whose benefit 
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Negligence per se provides that a statute sets the standard of conduct 
of a reasonable person such that violation of the statute satisfies the breach 
element of a negligence claim.70  Absent an excuse for the violation, the de-
fendant is liable for the plaintiff’s injuries.71  Negligence per se, however, 
does not constitute duty per se.72  Thus, in jurisdictions that have adopted 
negligence per se, a negligence claim based on the violation of a statute or 
ordinance can still fail if the defendant did not owe the plaintiff a duty.73  
When a court adopts a statutory standard of care and concurrently creates a 
duty it is called a “statutory duty action.”74 
Before a court adopts a standard of care set forth in a statute or regula-
tion, it must make additional determinations.  First, it must determine 
whether the plaintiff is a member of the class that the statute or regulation 
was designed to protect.75  Second, it must also determine whether the inju-
ry suffered is the type of injury that the statute or regulation was enacted to 
                                                          
the statute was enacted and suffered an injury of the type against which the statute protects, are 
issues of law to be decided by a trial court.”). 
 70.  Steward ex rel. Steward v. Holland Family Properties, LLC, 726 S.E.2d 251, 254 (Va. 
2012) (citing Schlimmer v. Poverty Hunt Club, 597 S.E.2d 43, 46 (Va. 2004)) (“When the stand-
ard of care is set by statute, an act which violates the statute is a per se violation of the standard of 
care.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 14 (2010) (defining 
negligence per se).  “Negligence per se” may also be used to describe any negligence claim arising 
out of the violation of a statute, ordinance, or regulation, which is not the strict legal definition of 
the term.  See Blackburn Ltd. P’ship v. Paul, 438 Md. 100, 105, 90 A.3d 464, 467 (2014) (describ-
ing claim as a “negligence per se action,” even though Maryland has not adopted negligence per 
se).   
 71.  E.g., Martin, 126 N.E. at 815 (“We think the unexcused omission of the statutory signals 
is more than some evidence of negligence.  It is negligence in itself.”).  Martin v. Herzog is a clas-
sic decision written by Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo that is often used to illustrate the concept of 
negligence per se.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 14 cmt. c 
(2010) (noting Martin v. Herzog’s “famous holding”).  
 72.  See Perry v. S.N., 973 S.W.2d 301, 306 (Tex. 1998) (noting that “there is generally no 
duty to protect another from the criminal acts of a third party or to come to the aid of another in 
distress” and that if the court authorized a negligence per se action, duty would be derived from 
the statute at issue). 
 73.  See id. (“[T]he defendant in most negligence per se cases already owes the plaintiff a pre-
existing common law duty to act as a reasonably prudent person, so that the statute’s role is mere-
ly to define more precisely what conduct breaches that duty.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 14 cmt. i (2010) (noting that a court should consider defend-
ant’s statutory violation as part of duty analysis in cases where defendant owes plaintiff no duty). 
 74.  See, e.g., Altz v. Leiberson, 134 N.E. 703, 704 (N.Y. 1922) (Cardozo, J.) (holding that 
New York’s Tenement House Law imposed a duty on landlords to keep rental premises in good 
repair even though provisions did not expressly impose a duty and landlords owe no duty to ten-
ants to keep rental premises in good repair at common law).  Many jurisdictions call statutory duty 
actions “negligence per se” even though negligence per se only involves the adoption of a statuto-
rily defined standard of care, not the creation of a duty.  See Bob Godfrey Pontiac, Inc. v. Roloff, 
630 P.2d 840, 844–45 (Or. 1981) (discussing the difference between negligence per se and statuto-
ry duty actions). 
 75.  E.g., Schlimmer v. Poverty Hunt Club, 597 S.E.2d 43, 46 (Va. 2004) (finding that hunter 
shot by fellow hunter was a member of the class of persons intended to be protected by statute 
making reckless handling of a firearm unlawful). 
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prevent.76  The class-of-persons analysis takes the place of the duty analysis 
in a traditional negligence claim.77  The type-of-injury analysis takes the 
place of the proximate cause (scope of risk) analysis.78 
Negligence per se takes much of the power out of the hands of the jury 
and puts it in the hands of the judge.79  In a negligence per se jurisdiction, 
the judge makes the type-of-injury and class-of-persons determinations.80  
The judge examines the statute at issue and determines whether it was in-
tended to protect a specific class of persons from a particular type of inju-
ry.81  If so, the judge considers whether the person bringing the claim is a 
member of this class and whether the injury suffered is of the type the stat-
ute was designed to prevent.82  If these requirements are met, the burden of 
proof shifts to the defendant to show that his violation is excused.83  The ju-
ry decides whether the defendant violated the statute, whether that violation 
was the cause in fact of the plaintiff’s injury, and the amount of damages.84  
The jury, however, does not get to decide the standard of conduct of the 
reasonably prudent person—the statute, ordinance, or regulation sets the 
standard of conduct for them.85 
Maryland is in the small minority of jurisdictions that have not adopt-
ed negligence per se.86  Instead, Maryland courts consider the violation of a 
statute or ordinance evidence of negligence.87  The judge makes preliminary 
determinations about the type-of-injury and class-of-persons.88  The jury 
                                                          
 76.  E.g., id. (concluding that accidental shooting of hunter in hunting party was type of injury 
statute making unlawful reckless handling of a firearm was intended to prevent). 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., A Primer on the Patterns of Negligence, 53 LA. L. REV. 1509, 
1515–16 (1993). 
 79.  See Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814, 815 (N.Y. 1920) (noting that the jury has “no dis-
pensing power” in a negligence per se action). 
 80.  Schlimmer, 597 S.E.2d at 46. 
 81.  See, e.g., Ferrell v. Baxter, 484 P.2d 250, 261 (Alaska 1971) (concluding that “regulation 
requiring drivers to remain within their lanes was at least partly designed to protect oncoming mo-
torists against head-on collisions”). 
 82.  See, e.g., id. (noting that before plaintiff is entitled to a jury instruction on negligence per 
se he must establish that he was of the class the regulation was designed to protect and his injuries 
were those the statute was designed to prevent). 
 83.  See, e.g., id. at 266 (discussing policy considerations for shifting burden of proof to de-
fendant in negligence per se action). 
 84.  Galligan, supra note 78, at 1518. 
 85.  Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814, 815 (N.Y. 1920). 
 86.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 14, Reporter’s Note, cmt. c 
(2010). 
 87.  E.g., Absolon v. Dollahite, 376 Md. 547, 553–54, 831 A.2d 6, 9–10 (2003) (“[T]he long 
established general rule in Maryland [is] that the violation of a statutory duty is only evidence of 
negligence, but does not establish negligence per se.”) (citing a string of Maryland cases dating 
back to 1932).   
 88.  See, e.g., Remsburg v. Montgomery, 376 Md. 568, 585–87, 831 A.2d 18, 28–29 (2003) 
(interpreting hunting regulations and concluding that while landowner was arguably within class 
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ultimately makes many determinations of its own: whether the defendant’s 
violation of the statute was the cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s injuries;89 
whether the defendant’s behavior was reasonable under the circumstances 
despite the statutory violation;90 and, if the defendant is liable, the amount 
in damages the plaintiff should be awarded.91 
In Maryland, a negligence claim based on a statutory violation will go 
to the jury only if the plaintiff can produce enough evidence that the de-
fendant’s alleged violation was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.92  
The defendant’s statutory violation is then merely a fact among many that 
the jury considers when determining whether the defendant was negligent.93  
This allows the jury to conclude that the defendant acted reasonably under 
the circumstances despite violating a statute.94  Thus, even if the plaintiff 
proves that the defendant has violated a statute, she may still not prevail.95  
The burden of proof remains with the plaintiff throughout the trial.96 
B.  State v. Longeley and Its Progeny Decline to Impose a Statutory 
Duty in Negligence Claims Arising out of the Violation of a Statute 
or Ordinance 
State v. Longeley97 and its progeny illustrate the operation of a Mary-
land common-law rule governing claims arising out of the violation of a 
statute or ordinance.98  These cases typically involve child trespassers who, 
absent a statutorily imposed duty, are not able to state a negligence claim 
because Maryland landowners owe a limited common-law duty to trespass-
ers.99  The rule provides that if no duty exists at common law, then a statute 
                                                          
of persons to be protected by the regulations, an accidental shooting was not the type of injury 
regulations were intended to protect against). 
 89.  See Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc., 378 Md. 70, 79, 835 A.2d 616, 621 (2003) (noting 
that proximate cause is established when a plaintiff satisfies the elements of the Statute or Ordi-
nance Rule). 
 90.  Id. at 85, 835 A.2d at 624. 
 91.  Galligan, supra note 78, at 1518. 
 92.  See, e.g., Austin v. Buettner, 211 Md. 61, 70, 124 A.2d 793, 798 (1956) (holding that 
evidence of building code violation proximately caused plaintiff’s fall and resulting injuries was 
sufficient to warrant submitting case to jury).  Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to create a 
genuine dispute of material fact; direct evidence is not required.  Dow v. L & R Props., Inc., 144 
Md. App. 67, 75, 796 A.2d 139, 143–44 (2002).  
 93.  Brooks, 378 Md. at 79, 835 A.2d at 621. 
 94.  See id. (“The trier of fact must then evaluate whether the actions taken by the defendant 
were reasonable under all the circumstances.”). 
 95.  If a jury concludes that the defendant acted reasonably under the circumstances, then the 
defendant was not negligent and the plaintiff will not recover. 
 96.  Galligan, supra note 78, at 1516. 
 97.  161 Md. 563, 158 A. 6 (1932). 
 98.  Id. at 569–70, 158 A. at 8. 
 99.  E.g., id. (finding that regulations requiring fence around quarry did not impose a duty and 
holding that quarry owner not liable in negligence for drowning death of twelve year old); Murphy 
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cannot operate to impose a statutory duty.100  This is because the court 
views the statute at issue as merely setting a standard of care as opposed to 
setting a standard of care and imposing a duty.101 
Maryland’s rule that declines to impose a statutory duty can be traced 
back to Longeley.  In Longeley, a twelve-year-old boy drowned in an aban-
doned quarry that had become filled with water.102  The boy’s parents 
brought a negligence suit against the owners of the quarry.103  The parents 
alleged, inter alia, that the quarry owners failed to enclose the quarry with a 
fence at least six feet high as required by the Baltimore City Code.104 
The court denied the boy’s parents the ability to bring a negligence ac-
tion against the quarry owners.105  In doing so, the Longeley court articulat-
ed a two-part rule to determine whether a statute (or code provision, as was 
the case here) can provide a cause of action in tort.106  First, the violation of 
the ordinance must be a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.107  Sec-
ond, the injured person must have had a right to be on the property at the 
time the injury occurred and must not be a trespasser.108  The court noted 
that the ordinance at issue was passed for the benefit of the public, but did 
not engage in any statutory interpretation.109  Then, applying the rule, the 
court reasoned that because the boy was a trespasser, the Baltimore City 
Code provision could not provide a cause of action in negligence.110 
Nearly forty years later, in Osterman v. Peters,111 the Maryland Court 
of Appeals used the Longeley rule to deny the father of a child trespasser a 
                                                          
v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 290 Md. 186, 193–95, 428 A.2d 459, 464–65 (1981), overruled on 
other grounds by Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Flippo, 348 Md. 680, 693-95, 705 A.2d 1144, 
1151 (1998) (applying Longeley rule and denying recovery to parents of trespassing four-and-a-
half-year-old boy who drowned in a funeral home’s pond); Osterman v. Peters, 260 Md. 313, 316–
17, 272 A.2d 21, 23 (1971) (applying Longeley rule and holding that father whose son had 
drowned in neighbor’s pool could not bring cause of action in tort); Kirby v. Hylton, 51 Md. App. 
365, 367, 377, 443 A.2d 640, 641, 646 (1982) (finding that Public Service Commission regula-
tions did not impose a duty on contractor and developer of housing subdivision and denying par-
ents of trespassing nine-year-old boy from bringing negligence case based on statutory violation).  
 100.  Longeley, 161 Md. at 569, 158 A. at 8. 
 101.  Id. at 570, 158 A. at 8. 
 102.  Id. at 565, 158 A. at 6.  Longeley is the consolidation of two cases against an abandoned 
quarry owner in which “[t]he two records are substantially identical.”  Id. at 564, 158 A. at 6. 
 103.  Id. at 565, 158 A. at 7.  
 104.  Id. at 566, 158 A. at 7.  The code provision required “each and every owner of abandoned 
or not actively operated quarries within the city limits to inclose by a fence, not less than six feet 
in heighth [sic], constructed in such manner and of such materials as will prevent any person from 
entering upon said quarry.”  Id.   
 105.  Id. at 570, 158 A. at 8. 
 106.  Id. at 569, 158 A. at 8.  
 107.  Id.   
 108.  Id.   
 109.  Id.   
 110.  Id. at 569–70, 158 A. at 8.  
 111.  260 Md. 313, 272 A.2d 21 (1971). 
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cause of action.112  In Osterman, a four-and-a-half-year-old boy drowned in 
a swimming pool when he went to retrieve a lost ball in the backyard of his 
neighbor’s vacant house.113  The boy’s father brought a negligence action 
against the pool owner.114  He alleged, inter alia, negligence based on the 
neighbor’s violation of the Montgomery County Code pool barrier provi-
sions.115  The court first reaffirmed the Maryland rule that a landowner 
owes no duty to trespassers, even children.116  Citing the Longeley rule, the 
court then held that because the boy was a trespasser, an alleged violation of 
the pool barrier regulations could not provide a cause of action in negli-
gence.117  Like in Longeley, the Osterman court did not engage in any statu-
tory interpretation.118  The court went on to characterize the case as a “dis-
tressing situation,” but nevertheless held fast to precedent because adhering 
to established rules of law promotes consistency and certainty in the admin-
istration of the law.119 
In 1981, the Maryland Court of Appeals had the opportunity to revisit 
its jurisprudence governing the violation of a statute or ordinance in Mur-
phy v. Baltimore Gas and Electric Company.120  In Murphy, a three-and-a-
half-year-old boy drowned in a pond on the property of a funeral home.121  
His parents, Douglas and Pamela Smith, brought suit against the funeral 
home alleging negligence for failure to maintain a fence around the pond in 
violation of the Baltimore County Code.122  The court found the facts of Os-
terman and Longeley so similar as to control the outcome of the Smiths’ 
case.123  Relying on Osterman and Longeley, and without examining the 
                                                          
 112.  Id. at 316–17, 272 A.2d at 23 (citing State v. Longeley, 161 Md. 563, 569–70, 158 A. 6, 
8 (1932)). 
 113.  Id. at 314, 272 A.2d at 22. 
 114.  Id.  The boy’s father brought suit in his own name and on behalf of his deceased son.  Id. 
 115.  Id. at 316, 272 A.2d at 23.  The Montgomery County Code provision required that “pri-
vate pools be fenced or surrounded with impenetrable planting, and that gates be equipped with 
self-closing and self-latching devices.”  Id.   
 116.  Id. at 314, 272 A.2d at 22 (“[T]he owner of land owes no duty to a trespasser or licensee, 
even one of tender years, except to abstain from willful or wanton misconduct . . . .”). 
 117.  Id. at 317, 272 A.2d at 23. 
 118.  Id. at 316–17, 272 A.2d at 23. 
 119.  Id. at 317–18, 272 A.2d at 23–24 (citing Demuth v. Old Town Bank of Baltimore, 85 
Md. 315, 320, 37 A. 266, 266 (1897)). 
 120.  290 Md. 186, 428 A.2d 459 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Baltimore Gas & 
Elec. Co. v. Flippo, 348 Md. 680, 695, 705 A.2d 1144, 1151 (1998).  Murphy is the consolidation 
of two cases.  Id. at 187–88, 428 A.2d at 461.  Only the second case is relevant to the legal back-
ground of Blackburn.  The first case involved a man who brought suit against Baltimore Gas and 
Electric to recover for injuries he sustained when he placed his hand on an electrical transformer 
owned by the company.  Id. at 188, 428 A.2d at 461.  
 121.  Id. at 189, 428 A.2d at 462.  
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. at 194, 428 A.2d at 464. 
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code provision at issue, the court denied the boy’s parents a cause of action 
in negligence for the violation of the ordinance.124 
C.  The Statute or Ordinance Rule Operates to Impose a Duty When 
None Exists at Common Law 
The Statute or Ordinance Rule imposes a statutory duty when there is 
no pre-existing common law duty.125  This means a case that would normal-
ly be dismissed for lack of duty may proceed to trial if the plaintiff can pro-
duce evidence that the defendant violated the statute.126  Unlike the Longe-
ley line of cases, courts applying the Statute or Ordinance Rule examine the 
language of the statute, ordinance, or regulation at issue.127  Indeed, such an 
analysis is necessary in order to determine whether the statute protects a 
specific class of persons from a particular type of injury.128 
The Court of Appeals provided elements of the rule for the first time in 
Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc.,129 a negligence case involving a landlord’s 
alleged violation of Baltimore City Housing Code provisions.130  The Hous-
ing Code provisions required landlords to keep rental premises free of flak-
ing, peeling, or chipping paint.131  A tenant, Shirley Parker, brought suit 
against her landlord individually and on behalf of her minor son, Sean, al-
leging, inter alia, negligence for the violation of this Housing Code provi-
sion.132  Ms. Parker alleged that her son suffered from lead poisoning due to 
his consumption of lead-based paint on the rental premises.133  Ms. Parker 
argued that Lewin Realty’s failure to keep the rental premises “free of any 
                                                          
 124.  Id. at 193–95, 428 A.2d at 464–65. 
 125.  See infra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 126.  See infra note 140. 
 127.  See infra notes 143–146 and accompanying text. 
 128.  See, e.g., Gourdine v. Crews, 405 Md. 722, 757–58, 955 A.2d 769, 790–91 (2008) (inter-
preting Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act); Remsburg v. Montgomery, 376 Md. 568, 585–87, 
831 A.2d 18, 27–29 (2003) (interpreting hunting regulations); Muthukumarana v. Montgomery 
Cnty., 370 Md. 447, 499, 805 A.2d 372, 403 (2002) (interpreting Maryland Annotated Code pro-
vision which requires counties to have a 911 and emergency response system); Moore v. Myers, 
161 Md. App. 349, 365–66, 868 A.2d 954, 963 (2005) (interpreting Prince George’s County ani-
mal control law). 
 129.  378 Md. 70, 79, 835 A.2d 616, 621 (2003).  Although the Court of Appeals provided the 
elements of the rule in Brooks, it was first referred to as the “‘statute or ordinance’ rule” in Po-
lakoff v. Turner, 385 Md. 467, 476, 869 A.2d 837, 843 (2005).  The court formally named “the 
two-part Brooks test (‘the Statute or Ordinance Rule’)” in Blackburn Limited Partnership v. Paul, 
438 Md. 100, 111–12 n.6, 90 A.3d 464, 470 n.6 (2014).  
 130.  Brooks, 378 Md. at 73, 835 A.2d at 618. 
 131.  Id. at 83, 835 A.2d at 623–24. 
 132.  Id. at 73, 835 A.2d at 618. 
 133.  Id., 835 A.2d at 617–18. 
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flaking, loose, or peeling paint,” in violation of the Housing Code, caused 
her son’s lead poisoning.134 
Although the Brooks court acknowledged that at common law a land-
lord owes no duty to a tenant to keep a rental premises in good repair, it 
found that another common-law rule applied.135  The rule provides that 
where the defendant’s duty is “prescribed by statute,” a violation of that 
statute is evidence of negligence.136  The Brooks court supplied the ele-
ments of this rule and explained its operation.  In order to make out a prima 
facie case of negligence, the plaintiff must first establish the violation of a 
statute or ordinance designed to protect a specific class of persons, includ-
ing the plaintiff.137  Then the plaintiff must show that the violation of the 
statute or ordinance was a proximate cause of her injury.138  The statutory 
violation was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury if the plaintiff is a 
member of the class of persons the statute was intended to protect, and the 
injury suffered was one the statute was designed to prevent.139  If there is 
evidence that the defendant’s violation proximately caused the plaintiff’s 
injury, the case to proceeds to trial.140  At trial, the burden is on the defend-
ant to produce evidence that she was not negligent.141  The jury must then 
determine whether the defendant acted reasonably under all of the circum-
stances.142 
After articulating this rule, the Brooks court considered whether the 
rule applied to the ordinance at issue.  Examining the Baltimore City Hous-
ing Code, the court noted that it “imposes numerous duties and obligations 
upon landlords who rent residential property to tenants.”143  Applying the 
rule, the Brooks court determined that element (a) of the rule was satisfied 
because, as tenants, Ms. Parker and her son were within the class of persons 
the Housing Code is designed to protect.144  The court also found that ele-
                                                          
 134.  Id. at 73, 83, 835 A.2d at 618, 624.  Ms. Parker also argued that she should not have the 
burden of pleading and proving that Lewin Realty had notice of a violation of the Housing Code 
provision.  Id. at 77, 835 A.2d at 620. 
 135.  Id. at 78, 835 A.2d at 620.   
 136.  Id. (quoting Brown v. Dermer, 357 Md. 344, 358–59, 744 A.2d 47, 55 (2000), overruled 
in part on other grounds by Brooks, 378 Md. at 72, 835 A.2d at 617).  The Brooks court traced the 
origins of the rule to a case from 1916, Flaccomio v. Eysink.  Id., 835 A.2d at 621.  In Flaccomio, 
the plaintiff purchased and consumed whiskey that contained wood alcohol.  Flaccomio v. Eysink, 
129 Md. 367, 371–72, 100 A. 510, 512 (1916).  After consuming the whiskey, he became blind.  
Id. at 372, 100 A. at 512.  Although the court cited a rule similar to the one articulated in Brooks, 
it concluded that the rule did not apply.  Id. at 380–81, 100 A. at 515. 
 137.  Brooks, 378 Md. at 79, 835 A.2d at 621. 
 138.  Id.  
 139.  Id.  
 140.  Id.  
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. at 81, 835 A.2d at 622. 
 144.  Id. 
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ment (b) was satisfied because Sean was within the class of persons the 
statute was designed to protect and his injury, lead paint poisoning, was the 
type of injury the drafters intended to prevent.145  Based on the plain lan-
guage of the statute, the court concluded that Baltimore’s Mayor and City 
Council intended to imposed a “continuing duty” on landlords to keep the 
rental premises “free of flaking, loose, or peeling paint.”146  Therefore, Ms. 
Parker had established a prima facie case of negligence, which allowed her 
case to go to the jury.147 
Nine years later, the Court of Appeals decided Allen v. Dackman,148 
another lead paint case involving the same Baltimore City Housing Code 
provisions as in Brooks.149  Allen extended the Brooks holding, ruling that 
the Housing Code imposed upon landlords a duty to inspect and maintain 
rental property even when the occupants of the premises had no legal right 
of possession.150  In Allen, Monica Allen brought suit against her landlord 
on behalf of her two minor children for injuries arising from their alleged 
exposure to lead-based paint on her rental premises.151  Unlike the Brooks 
tenants, however, Ms. Allen was in wrongful possession of the rental prop-
erty.152 
The Allen court held that the Housing Code imposed a duty on the 
landlord to keep the rental property free of flaking, loose, and peeling paint, 
notwithstanding the fact that Ms. Allen and her children were trespassers.153  
In so holding, the court reasoned that the Housing Code was intended to 
“protect occupants of dwellings,” and that Ms. Allen and her children fit the 
definition of “occupants” under the Housing Code.154  The court thus con-
cluded that Ms. Allen and her children were part of the class of persons the 
statute was designed to protect even though they were trespassers on the 
rental property.155 
                                                          
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. at 84, 835 A.2d at 624. 
 147.  Id. at 89, 835 A.2d at 627. 
 148.  413 Md. 132, 991 A.2d 1216 (2010).  
 149.  Id. at 143–45, 991 A.2d at 1222–23 (citing BALT. CITY CODE, Art. 13, §§ 103(a), 103(b), 
310(a), 702(a), and 703(c)(3) (2000)); Brooks, 378 Md. at 81–83, 835 A.2d at 622–24 (same). 
 150.  Allen, 413 Md. at 158, 991 A.2d at 1231. 
 151.  Id. at 137, 991 A.2d at 1219. 
 152.  Id. at 139, 991 A.2d at 1220.  During Ms. Allen’s occupancy of the rental premises the 
title to the property transferred from her original landlord to a new landlord.  Id.  The new land-
lord subsequently informed Ms. Allen that she had thirty days to vacate the premises.  Id.  Ms. 
Allen failed to do so and remained in possession of the rental property even after the District 
Court for Baltimore City determined that she was in wrongful possession of the property.  Id.  Af-
ter several months, Ms. Allen was eventually evicted from the property.  Id.   
 153.  Id. at 157–58, 991 A.2d at 1231. 
 154.  Id. at 157, 991 A.2d at 1230. 
 155.  Id. at 158, 991 A.2d at 1231. 
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Maryland courts have also applied the Statute or Ordinance Rule in 
non-lead paint cases.  In some of these cases the court has imposed a statu-
tory duty,156 while declining to do so in others.157  For example, in Warr v. 
JMGM Group,158 the Court of Appeals declined to impose civil liability for 
the violation of a criminal statute prohibiting the sale of liquor to intoxicat-
ed persons.159  The court reasoned that because the statute “does not identi-
fy a particular class of protectees,” it did not meet the requirements of the 
Statute or Ordinance Rule.160  By contrast, in Wietzke v. Chesapeake Con-
ference Ass’n,161 the court found that a Montgomery County Code sediment 
control permitting scheme imposed a duty on property owners to refrain 
from “land-disturbing activity” that would cause damage to others’ private 
property.162  The court concluded, “the ordinance clearly encompasses the 
type of harm the Wietzkes complain of, the washing of certain ‘materials’ 
onto their property, and protects a class of persons encompassing the 
Wietzkes, private landowners in Montgomery County.”163  The Statute or 
Ordinance Rule has now expanded beyond its original application in Balti-
more City Housing Code lead paint cases. 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Blackburn Limited Partnership v. Paul, the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.164  The court 
held that the Statute or Ordinance Rule can operate to create a duty of care 
despite a property owner’s limited common-law duty to trespassers.165  The 
court also held that the Code of Maryland Regulations concerning pool 
safety applied to the apartment complex’s pool.166  Additionally, at the time 
of his accident, Christopher, as a three-year-old, was a member of the class 
                                                          
 156.  See, e.g., Wietzke v. Chesapeake Conference Ass’n, 421 Md. 355, 395, 26 A.3d 931, 955 
(2011); see also Moore v. Myers, 161 Md. App. 349, 365–66, 868 A.2d 954, 964 (2005) (finding 
that Prince George’s County animal control law satisfied the Statute or Ordinance Rule). 
 157.  See, e.g., Gourdine v. Crews, 405 Md. 722, 757–58, 955 A.2d 769, 790–91 (2008) (hold-
ing that the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act were enacted to protect the public health, not a 
particular class); Remsburg v. Montgomery, 376 Md. 568, 586, 831 A.2d 18, 28–29 (2003) (de-
clining to impose a duty where the hunting regulations at issue were not intended to protect 
against the type of injury the plaintiff suffered); Muthukumarana v. Montgomery Cnty., 370 Md. 
447, 499, 805 A.2d 372, 403 (2002) (holding that Maryland Code provision requiring counties to 
have an emergency response system in place does not “benefit a discrete group of persons”). 
 158.  433 Md. 170, 70 A.3d 347 (2013). 
 159.  Id. at 199, 70 A.3d at 364. 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  421 Md. 355, 26 A.3d 931 (2011). 
 162.  Id. at 392–93, 26 A.3d at 954. 
 163.  Id. at 393, 26 A.3d at 954. 
 164.  Blackburn Ltd. P’ship v. Paul, 438 Md. 100, 107, 90 A.3d 464, 468 (2014). 
 165.  Id. at 117, 90 A.3d at 474. 
 166.  Id. at 124, 90 A.3d at 478. 
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of persons the regulations were enacted to protect.167  Finally, there was 
sufficient evidence that Christopher’s injuries were the result of a violation 
of the pool safety regulations such that the case should be submitted to the 
jury.168 
The Blackburn court also determined whether a statutory duty could 
supersede a common-law duty.  The court acknowledged that, under Mary-
land law, property owners owe no affirmative duty to trespassers, even 
children.169  The court then considered two recent cases applying the Statute 
or Ordinance Rule, Brooks v. Lewin Realty III and Allen v. Dackman.170  
Brooks and Allen concerned a Baltimore City Housing Code provision that 
required landlords to ensure that their rental premises did not contain any 
flaking or peeling paint.171  Despite the rule’s initial application being lim-
ited to the landlord-tenant context, the court found that the reasoning in 
these cases applied broadly.172  The court thus concluded that the Statute or 
Ordinance Rule could operate to create a duty above and beyond a com-
mon-law duty, even to a trespasser, when the statute at issue was designed 
to protect a particular class of persons.173  The court emphasized that in or-
der for the Statute or Ordinance Rule to apply, the statute at issue must 
“aim[] to protect a more targeted class of persons,” not just the general pub-
lic.174  Based on Warr v. JMGM Group, Blackburn also argued that the 
statute at issue must expressly impose a duty for the Statute or Ordinance 
Rule to apply.175  The court rejected Blackburn’s argument, noting that the 
statute at issue in Warr “failed to define a particular class to be protected,” 
which was not the case with the pool safety regulations.176 
                                                          
 167.  Id. at 126, 90 A.3d at 479. 
 168.  Id. at 128, 90 A.3d at 480. 
 169.  Id. at 110–11, 90 A.3d at 470. 
 170.  Id. at 111–13, 90 A.3d at 470–71. 
 171.  See supra Part II.C. 
 172.  Blackburn, 438 Md. at 115, 90 A.3d at 473. 
 173.  Id. at 114, 90 A.3d at 472.  The court also considered the cases on which Blackburn 
based their argument that they owed no affirmative duty to trespasser: Osterman, Longeley, and 
Murphy.  Id. at 113–14, 90 A.3d at 471–72.  Here, the court distinguished the Longeley line of 
cases from the Brooks line.  Id. at 114, 90 A.3d 472.  The court pointed to the fact that the statutes 
in the Longeley line of cases were “passed for the benefit of the public,” and not a specific class of 
persons like the ordinances in the Brooks line, which is why the Statute or Ordinance Rule did not 
apply in the Longeley line.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court also rejected Black-
burn’s argument that Allen should be narrowly confined to the Baltimore City Housing Code’s 
lead paint abatement provisions.  Id. at 115, 90 A.3d at 472.  Instead, the court concluded that its 
holding in Allen should be read broadly, reiterating its earlier point that the Statute or Ordinance 
Rule is meant to apply in any case where the statute or ordinance is meant to protect a specific 
class of persons.  Id. at 115–16, 90 A.3d at 472–73.  The court interpreted the COMAR provisions 
in effect at the time of Christopher’s near-drowning on June 13, 2010.  Id. at 105 n.5, 90 A.3d at 
467 n.5. 
 174.  Id. at 114, 90 A.3d at 472. 
 175.  Id. at 116, 90 A.3d at 473. 
 176.  Id. at 117, 90 A.3d at 474. 
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The Court of Appeals found that the defendants owed Christopher a 
statutory duty under COMAR 10.17.01.01–.54.177  The court first deter-
mined that Blackburn’s pool meets the definition of a “recreational pool” as 
set forth in COMAR 10.17.01.05(B)(19)(f)(v), and that under COMAR 
10.17.01.13 existing recreational pools must comply with the regulations 
enacted in 1997.178  The court then examined COMAR 10.17.01.21, which 
sets forth the requirements for pool barriers.179  The court also examined the 
exemptions from the regulations set forth in COMAR 10.17.01.03.180  In 
finding that Blackburn was required to comply with the 1997 COMAR reg-
ulations, the court relied on COMAR 10.17.01.03(D)(1).181  The court re-
jected Blackburn’s argument that subsection .03(D)(1) only applies to the 
pool, and not its appurtenant structures, that is, barriers, because the section 
omits mention of such structures.182  Instead, the court read the provision 
broadly, concluding that the phrase “the requirements of this chapter” is 
meant to include the barrier provisions, not just the regulations governing 
pools themselves.183 
In determining the scope of the pool safety regulations, the Court of 
Appeals also examined their intended purpose.184  Here, Appendix E of the 
National Spa and Pool Institute’s (“NSPI”) Model Barrier Code for Resi-
dential Swimming Pools, Spas, and Hot Tubs, which is incorporated by ref-
erence into the pool regulations, informed the court’s analysis.185  The court 
found significance in the Preamble to the NSPI’s Model Barrier Code when 
it stated that it is intended to prevent drownings and near-drownings of 
                                                          
 177.  Id. at 125–26, 90 A.3d at 479 (“[U]nder COMAR 10.17.01.21, Petitioners were required 
to provide a barrier that did not allow passage of a sphere 4 inches in diameter, except when the 
entrance gate was open.  This language sets forth mandatory acts for the protection of a particular 
class identified in the Model Barrier Code—namely, children under the age of five.  Christopher, 
three years old at the time of the accident, was clearly a member of this protected class.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 178.  Id. at 118, 90 A.3d at 474. 
 179.  Id. at 118–19, 90 A.3d at 474–75.  COMAR provides: “Except when the entrance gate is 
open, an opening in the barrier and in the gate does not allow passage of a sphere 4 inches in di-
ameter . . . .”  COMAR 10.17.01.21(3) (2014). 
 180.  Blackburn, 438 Md. at 119–20, 90 A.3d at 475–76.   
 181.  Id. at 121–22, 90 A.3d at 476–77.  COMAR 10.17.01.03 exempts pools constructed prior 
to the implementation of the February 10, 1997 regulations from specific subsections of the newly 
enacted regulations.  COMAR 10.17.01.03 (2014).  The code section states that the exemptions do 
not apply where “[t]he previously approved pool or spa has a condition that jeopardizes the health 
or safety of the public, in which case the owner shall ensure that the condition is corrected to meet 
the requirements of this chapter . . . .”  26 Md. Reg. 1258 (July 30, 1999). 
 182.  Blackburn, 438 Md. at 121–22, 90 A.3d at 476–77. 
 183.  Id. at 122, 90 A.3d at 477. 
 184.  Id. at 122–24, 90 A.3d at 477–78. 
 185.  Id.  The NSPI’s Model Barrier Code states that its intended purpose is “[p]rotecting 
young children from accidental drownings and near-drownings in all aquatic environments.”  Id. 
at 123, 90 A.3d at 477. 
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those under five years of age.186  Reading COMAR 10.17.01.03D(1) in con-
junction with Appendix E, the court concluded that the exception to the 
regulation’s grandfathering provisions applied to both pools and barriers.187 
The Court of Appeals found that the pool safety regulation’s barrier 
provisions met the requirements of the Statute or Ordinance Rule, and 
therefore could provide the basis for Blackburn’s liability in negligence.188  
In so holding, the court relied on its earlier finding that the pool safety regu-
lations incorporated by reference the Model Barrier Code which is intended 
to protect a particular class of people, specifically, children under five years 
of age.189  Examining the regulation at issue, the court reasoned that in set-
ting forth a specific measurement, the statute provides pool owners with 
“mandatory acts for the protection of a particular class identified in the 
Model Barrier Code—namely, children under the age of five.”190  Thus, the 
court concluded that when the accident occurred, three-year-old Christopher 
was a member of the class that the statute was intended to protect.191  Af-
firming the Court of Special Appeals ruling, the Court of Appeals found 
that there was sufficient evidence of Blackburn’s possible violation of the 
pool safety regulations to survive a motion for summary judgment.192 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
In Blackburn Limited Partnership v. Paul, the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals held that the Statute or Ordinance Rule can operate to impose a duty 
on landowners despite their limited duty to trespassers under the common 
law.193  The court further held that Maryland’s pool safety regulations satis-
fied the requirements of the Statute or Ordinance Rule, therefore Blackburn 
could be held liable for its violation of the regulations.194  The Blackburn 
court arrived at these holdings by first distinguishing the Brooks v. Lewin 
Realty III, Inc. and State v. Longeley lines of cases.195  The court distin-
guished these cases based on a false distinction between the statutes at is-
                                                          
 186.  Id. at 122–23, 90 A.3d at 477. 
 187.  Id. at 124, 90 A.3d at 478. 
 188.  Id. at 126, 90 A.3d at 479.  
 189.  Id. 
 190.  Id. at 125, 90 A.3d at 479.   
 191.  Id. at 126, 90 A.3d at 479. 
 192.  Id. at 127, 90 A.3d at 479.  In determining whether there was sufficient evidence for Ali-
cia Paul’s case against Blackburn to survive summary judgment, the court examined the eviden-
tiary record from the Court of Special Appeals.  Id., 90 A.3d at 480.  Although it noted that under 
Maryland law a violation of the regulations only constitutes evidence of negligence because the 
statute does not expressly provide for a negligence per se action, the court nonetheless agreed with 
the Court of Special Appeals that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Chris-
topher entered the pool through a faulty gate.  Id. at 126–27, 90 A.3d at 479. 
 193.  Id. at 117, 90 A.3d at 474. 
 194.  Id. at 126, 90 A.3d at 479. 
 195.  Id. at 114, 90 A.3d at 472. 
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sue—statutes that are enacted for the benefit of the general public as op-
posed to statutes that aim to protect a more “targeted class.”196  This led the 
court to maintain two conflicting rules governing negligence claims arising 
out of the violation of a statute or ordinance.197 
Next, the court examined the Maryland pool safety regulations and 
concluded that they were intended to protect a “targeted class”—children 
under five years of age.198  Here, the court further erred in failing to provide 
clear guidelines for when a statute or ordinance meets the Statute or Ordi-
nance Rule’s “targeted class” requirement.199  The court should have con-
sidered that an analytical framework for the “targeted class” requirement 
would foster the consistent and predictable application of the Statute or Or-
dinance Rule.200  To further aid these goals, the court should have also 
acknowledged that it is changing its handling of negligence claims arising 
from a statutory violation by overruling Longeley and its progeny.201 
A.  The Court’s Misreading of Longeley Led It to Erroneously Maintain 
Two Conflicting Rules Governing Negligence Claims Arising out of 
a Statutory Violation 
The court’s misreading of Longeley led it to erroneously maintain two 
conflicting rules governing negligence claims arising out of the violation of 
a statute, ordinance, or regulation.  The Blackburn court distinguished the 
Longeley line from the Brooks line based on a false distinction between the 
statutes at issue in the cases.202  The court reasoned that the statutes in the 
Longeley line of cases were “passed for the benefit of the public,” therefore 
because they did not define a “targeted class,” they could not impose a du-
ty.203  The statutes in the Brooks line of cases, on the other hand, “aim[] to 
protect a more targeted class of persons,” therefore they define a class of 
persons to which a duty is owed.204  This means a person can be held liable 
for the violation of such statutes.205 
As the Blackburn court explained, Longeley, Osterman, and Murphy 
“did not engage in a careful application of the Statute or Ordinance Rule” 
because the statues in those cases were passed for the benefit of the pub-
                                                          
 196.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 197.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 198.  Blackburn, 438 Md. at 125, 90 A.3d at 479. 
 199.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 200.  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 201.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 202.  Blackburn, 438 Md. at 114, 90 A.3d at 472. 
 203.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 204.  Id.   
 205.  See id. at 113, 90 A.3d at 471 (noting that “the tort action in [Allen v. Dackman] survived 
summary judgment, despite the plaintiffs’ status as trespassers under the common law”). 
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lic.206  The court’s logic does not hold for two reasons.  First, in order for a 
court to determine whether a statute was passed for the benefit of the public 
it needs to examine the statutory language.207  Yet the Longeley, Osterman, 
and Murphy courts did not engage in any statutory analysis.208  Second, if 
the Longeley, Osterman, and Murphy courts had examined the statutes at 
issue in these cases, it is possible that the statutes might have satisfied the 
requirements of the Statute or Ordinance Rule.209 
The Court of Appeals failed to see a more plausible reading of the 
Longeley line of cases.  The courts did not examine the statutory language 
because they did not even reach the question of whether the defendant was 
negligent or not.  Longeley and its progeny were all dismissed because the 
defendants did not owe the plaintiffs a duty.210  Therefore, the statutes and 
regulations in those cases could not set the defendants’ standard of conduct, 
which is why the court did not need to examine their language.211  Moreo-
ver, the Longeley rule, unlike the Statute or Ordinance Rule, does not oper-
ate to impose a statutory duty.212  This means if there is no pre-existing 
common law duty, then there is no reason for the court to consider whether 
the statute can set the standard or care.213 
The Blackburn court’s discussion of Osterman and Longeley reveals 
its misunderstanding of the Longeley rule.214  Quoting Longeley, the court 
emphasizes the fact that “[t]he ordinance in this case was passed for the 
benefit of the public.”215  The Longeley passage quoted by the court imme-
diately goes on to clarify that a landowner cannot be held liable for the vio-
lation of an ordinance unless the landlord owed a duty to the injured per-
son.216  The Court of Appeals, however, relies on the first part of the 
Longeley rule, interpreting it to mean that if a statute is passed for the bene-
fit of the public, it cannot impose a duty on a defendant.217  This is a mis-
reading of the Longeley rule.  The Longeley court is merely characterizing 
                                                          
 206.  Id. at 114, 90 A.3d at 472. 
 207.  See, e.g., Warr v. JMGM Grp., LLC, 433 Md. 170, 198–99, 70 A.3d 347, 364 (2013) 
(applying Statute or Ordinance Rule, interpreting MD. CODE ANN., ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES § 1-
101(a)(3) (LexisNexis 1957 & 2011 Repl. Vol.), and declining to impose dram shop liability be-
cause “the statute does not identify a particular class of protectees”).   
 208.  See supra notes 109, 118 & 124 and accompanying text. 
 209.  See infra Part IV.C.1. 
 210.  See supra note 99. 
 211.  See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 212.  See supra Part II.B. 
 213.  See State v. Longeley, 161 Md. 563, 570–69, 158 A. 6, 8 (1932) (noting that before the 
court will allow an action in negligence to proceed, the defendant must owe the plaintiff a duty).  
 214.  Blackburn Ltd. P’ship v. Paul, 438 Md. 100, 113–14, 90 A.3d 464, 471–72 (2014). 
 215.  Id. at 113, 90 A.3d at 472 (emphasis omitted). 
 216.  Id. at 113–114, 90 A.3d at 472 (quoting State v. Longeley, 161 Md. 563, 569–70, 158 A. 
6, 8 (1932)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 217.  Id. at 114, 90 A.3d at 472.   
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the type of statute at issue.  The Blackburn court’s misreading overlooks the 
fact that after characterizing the statute the Longeley court immediately 
goes on to state “[b]ut, before an individual can hold such owner liable for 
an injury alleged to have resulted from such violation, there must be  . . . a 
duty on the part of the defendant,” which imposes a pre-existing duty re-
quirement.218  The Longeley court had no reason to consider whether the 
ordinance could set the standard of care because the quarry owner owed no 
duty to the trespassing child. 
The Court of Appeals made the same error with the Osterman case.  
While acknowledging that the Osterman court did not engage in any statu-
tory analysis, the Blackburn court concluded that the reason the Osterman 
court did not analyze the ordinance was because it was designed to benefit 
the general public.219  The court did not explain, however, how the Oster-
man court could have drawn such a conclusion without examining the lan-
guage of the ordinance.220  Like with Longeley, the Blackburn court failed 
to recognize that the Osterman court did not engage in any statutory analy-
sis because there was no pre-existing duty between the landowner and the 
trespassing child.221  Therefore, the fact that the statutes were passed for the 
benefit of the public would not have precluded the Longeley or Osterman 
courts from using them to set the standard of care.222  These faulty analyses 
led the Blackburn court to maintain two conflicting rules governing negli-
gence claims arising out of statutory violations. 
B.  The Blackburn Court Erred in Failing to Provide Clear Guidelines 
for the Statute or Ordinance Rule’s “Targeted Class” Requirement 
In Blackburn, the court began by examining the plain language of the 
pool safety regulations, which is consistent with precedent.223  Then, it de-
parted from the analysis it used in previous cases by examining the regula-
tions’ Documents Incorporated by Reference.224  In the wake of the Black-
burn court’s analysis, it is now difficult to discern when a statute “aims to 
protect a more targeted class of persons” and when it was merely “passed 
                                                          
 218.  Longeley, 161 Md. at 569, 158 A. at 8. 
 219.  Blackburn, 438 Md. at 114 n.8, 90 A.3d at 472 n.8. 
 220.  See id. at 114, 90 A.3d at 472 (noting that the Longeley, Osterman, and Murphy courts 
“did not engage in a careful application of the Statute or Ordinance Rule”). 
 221.  See id. (noting that the Longeley, Osterman, and Murphy courts “relied on the plaintiff’s 
status as trespasser to deny relief”). 
 222.  See Longeley, 161 Md. at 569–70, 158 A. at 8 (noting that the two requirements for a 
plaintiff to bring a negligence action based on statutory violation—(1) the violation was the prox-
imate cause of the person’s injury; and (2) at the time of the injury the person had the right to be 
on the property—do not apply unless the plaintiff owes the defendant a duty of care). 
 223.  Blackburn, 438 Md. at 117–22, 90 A.3d at 474–77. 
 224.  See infra note 230. 
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for the benefit of the public.”225  This makes it hard to determine when the 
Statute or Ordinance Rule applies to a particular legislative enactment, and, 
as a result, makes it difficult to predict when the court will impose civil lia-
bility for an alleged statutory violation.226  A clear analytical framework for 
the “targeted class” requirement is necessary in order to ensure consistent 
and predictable application of the Statute or Ordinance Rule.227 
1.  Previous Cases Applying the Statute or Ordinance Rule Suggest 
That the Blackburn Court Should Have Relied on the Plain 
Language of the Regulation in Its “Targeted Class” Analysis 
The Blackburn court’s “targeted class” analysis is inconsistent with 
precedent because it goes beyond examining the plain language of the pool 
safety regulations and considers their Documents Incorporated by Refer-
ence.228  This is where the court found the pool safety regulations’ “targeted 
class”—in the Model Barrier Code for Residential Swimming Pools, Spas, 
and Hot Tubs.229  In previous cases applying the Statute or Ordinance Rule, 
the court typically considered only the plain language of the legislative en-
actment at issue.230  The Blackburn court’s departure from precedential 
analysis makes it hard for plaintiffs and defendants alike to predict when 
the Statute or Ordinance Rule will apply to a particular statute, ordinance, 
or regulation.231 
A comparison of the “targeted class” analysis in a previous case, Allen 
v. Dackman, with the Blackburn court’s analysis reveals how the Blackburn 
court’s approach is inconsistent with precedent.  The Allen case involved a 
landlord’s alleged violation of the Baltimore City Housing Code’s lead-
paint abatement provisions.232  The Allen court examined the Housing Code 
and concluded that the City Council enacted it with the express purpose of 
protecting “occupants of dwellings”233—a term also explicitly defined in 
the “Definitions” section of the Housing Code and used in its provisions.234  
                                                          
 225.  See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 226.  See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 227.  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 228.  See infra note 230. 
 229.  Blackburn Ltd. P’ship v. Paul, 438 Md. 100, 125, 90 A.3d 464, 479 (2014). 
 230.  Compare id. at 122–25, 122 90 A.3d at 477–78, 477 (“[W]e draw support from the pur-
poses and context of the [pool safety regulations] chapter as a whole.”), with Allen v. Dackman, 
413 Md. 132, 142, 156–58, 991 A.2d 1216, 1222, 1231 (2010) (“[W]e begin our inquiry with the 
words of the statute and, ordinarily, when the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous, ac-
cording to their commonly understood meaning, we end our inquiry there also.”  (quoting Dyer v. 
Otis Warren Real Estate Co., 371 Md. 576, 581, 810 A.2d 938, 941 (2002)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 231.  See infra note 245 and accompanying text. 
 232.  Allen, 413 Md. at 158, 991 A.2d at 1231. 
 233.  Id. at 157, 991 A.2d at 1231. 
 234.  Id. at 157–58, 991 A.2d at 1231. 
 644 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 74:621 
By contrast, the pool safety regulations in Blackburn do not expressly de-
fine a class to be protected, at least not in the “Definitions” section of the 
regulations, as does the Housing Code.235  In fact, Blackburn argued that 
neither the Maryland Register’s “Notice of Proposed Action” nor the pool 
safety regulations identify a class of persons to be protected.236  Thus, it 
would seem that the pool safety regulations fail to satisfy the “targeted 
class” requirement.  The Court of Appeals acknowledged as much.237 
If the Blackburn court had stopped its “targeted class” analysis after 
examining the plain language of the regulations, then Blackburn would not 
have been held liable for Christopher’s near-drowning.238  But the court did 
not stop its inquiry there.  Instead, it turned to the Documents Incorporated 
by Reference into the pool safety regulations.239  One of the Documents In-
corporated by Reference is the Model Barrier Code for Residential Swim-
ming Pools, Spas, and Hot Tubs, which identifies five-year-olds as the most 
at-risk group for accidental drowning.240  This is where the Court of Ap-
peals found the pool safety regulations’ “targeted class”—children under 
five years of age.241 
The Court of Appeals did not engage in this type of analysis in other 
cases involving the Statute or Ordinance Rule.  In other cases, like Allen, 
the court stopped after looking at the plain language of the statute, and 
sometimes the legislative record.242  It never searched for a “targeted class” 
in the Documents Incorporated by Reference as the Blackburn court did.243  
                                                          
 235.  Compare 22 Md. Reg. 1469–70 (July 7, 1995), and 32 Md. Reg. 1468 (Aug. 19, 2005) 
(“Definitions” section of the pool safety regulations), with Allen, 413 Md. at 143, 991 A.2d at 
1222 (noting that an “occupant” is defined by the Baltimore City Housing Code as “the person 
who actually uses or has possession of the premises” (quoting BALT. CITY CODE, Art. 13, 
§ 105(gg) (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 236.  Blackburn Ltd. P’ship v. Paul, 438 Md. 100, 125, 90 A.3d 464, 478 (2014).  The Notice 
of Proposed Action arguably defines a protected class: “individuals at public and semipublic 
swimming pools in spas, and limited-use public pools in Maryland.”  Id. at n.16, 90 A.3d at n.16.   
 237.  Id. at 125, 90 A.3d at 478. 
 238.  See id. at 116, 90 A.3d at 473 (citing precedent for proposition that, in order for the Stat-
ute or Ordinance Rule to apply, the statute at issue must aim to protect a particular class of per-
sons).  
 239.  Id. at 122–25, 90 A.3d at 477–78.  
 240.  Id. at 124, 90 A.3d at 478. 
 241.  Id. at 125, 90 A.3d at 479.  The irony here is that the Preamble to the Model Barrier Code 
emphasizes supervision of children as key to preventing drownings and near-drownings.  Id. at 
123, 90 A.3d at 477.  The Model Barrier Code “establishes layers of protection to supplement and 
complement the requirement for constant adult supervision of young children around aquatic envi-
ronments.”  Id.  
 242.  E.g., Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc., 378 Md. 70, 81, 835 A.2d 616, 622 (2003) (relying 
on previous interpretation from Brown v. Dermer, 357 Md. 344, 367, 744 A.2d 47, 60 (2000), that 
Baltimore City Code provision was enacted to protect children from lead paint poisoning); Mu-
thukumarana v. Montgomery Cnty., 370 Md. 447, 499, 805 A.2d 372, 403 (2002) (interpreting 
Maryland Code provision requiring all counties to have a 911 and emergency response system and 
concluding that it “does not create an emergency system to benefit a discrete group of persons”).  
 243.  See supra note 230. 
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The Court of Appeals’ departure from its previous “targeted class” analysis 
appears to limit the circumstances under which the Statute or Ordinance 
Rule will apply.  Here, the Court of Appeals narrowed the Court of Special 
Appeals’ holding that the pool-going public is the regulation’s “targeted 
class,” a holding based on the plain language of the regulation.244  Going 
beyond the plain language of the statute creates uncertainty as to when it 
applies to a particular statute, ordinance, or regulation.245  This makes it dif-
ficult for litigators to determine when a defendant may be held liable for a 
negligence claim based on a statutory violation.246  But this all depends on 
which “targeted class” analysis the court employs—the analysis from 
Brooks and its progeny or the analysis from Blackburn. 
2.  The Court of Appeals Should Have Provided Clear Guidelines 
for the “Targeted Class” Requirement 
In Blackburn, the Court of Appeals emphasized the fact that the “tar-
geted class” requirement puts a “needed check” on the Statute or Ordinance 
Rule’s application,247 yet it failed to provide an analytical framework for 
this requirement.  In the case below, the Court of Special Appeals used the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 286 to inform its Statute or Ordi-
nance Rule analysis.248  The Court of Special Appeals found that the pool 
safety regulations protected a broader class of persons—“the general public, 
those who use swimming pools.”249  The Court of Appeals narrowed the 
lower court’s holding when it restricted the “targeted class” to children un-
der five years of age.250  The court’s narrower “targeted class” conclusion 
begs the question: What if Christopher Paul had been six years old?  Fifteen 
years old?  An adult?  There is no clear answer. 
The Blackburn decision leaves Maryland courts without clear guide-
lines for determining when a statute defines a “targeted class,” which makes 
it difficult to predict when the Statute or Ordinance Rule will apply to a par-
ticular legislative enactment.251  The court should have analyzed the statutes 
                                                          
 244.  See infra notes 249–250 and accompanying text. 
 245.  Blackburn, 438 Md. at 116, 90 A.3d at 473 (noting that “part (a) of the Statute or Ordi-
nance Rule already sets a meaningful limitation on a court’s ability to apply it”).  Part (a) of the 
Statute or Ordinance Rule requires that the plaintiff show “the violation of a statute or ordinance 
designed to protect a specific class of persons which includes the plaintiff”—that is, the “targeted 
class” requirement.  Id. at 112, 90 A.3d at 471 (quoting Brooks, 378 Md. at 79, 835 A.2d at 621). 
 246.  Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 38 (2012) cmt. d (noting 
that if a statute is used to impose tort liability where previously there was none the court essential-
ly “creates a new basis for liability not previously recognized by tort law”).  
 247.  Blackburn, 438 Md. at 116 n.11, 90 A.3d at 473 n.11. 
 248.  See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text.  
 249.  Paul v. Blackburn Ltd. P’ship, 211 Md. App. 52, 107, 63 A.3d 1107, 1139, aff’d, 438 
Md. 100, 90 A.3d 464 (2014). 
 250.  Blackburn, 438 Md. at 125, 90 A.3d at 479. 
 251.  See infra Part IV.C.1. 
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at issue using settled principles of statutory interpretation because it would 
allow litigants to better predict when a statutory violation may impose civil 
liability.252  Providing clear principles of statutory interpretation for deter-
mining when a statute “aims to protect a more targeted class” would thus 
foster consistency and predictability.253 
C.  The Court of Appeals Should Have Expressly Acknowledged That It 
Is Changing Its Handling of Negligence Claims Arising out of the 
Violation of a Statute, Ordinance, or Regulation 
In Blackburn, the Court of Appeals failed to expressly acknowledge 
that it is changing the handling of negligence claims arising out of the viola-
tion of a statute or ordinance when it relied on the heretofore obscure and 
unlabeled Statute or Ordinance Rule.254  Ironically, the Blackburn court’s 
adherence to the principles of stare decisis255 do not foster consistency and 
predictability—the very reason courts usually invoke the doctrine.256  Hav-
ing two separate and conflicting rules governing negligence claims arising 
from statutory violation leads to inconsistent and unpredictable results.257  
Although the Statute or Ordinance Rule may have initially been intended to 
apply only to lead-paint cases, its application has since expanded and the 
Court of Appeals should have acknowledged that it is now the only rule that 
governs negligence claims arising out of a statutory violation.258 
                                                          
 252.  Cf. Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory Interpretation 
Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863, 1887 (2008) (arguing that, in the federal context, “interpretive 
regimes” for statutory interpretation would “make the law more predictable to citizens and help to 
limit judicial discretion”).  When employing principles of statutory interpretation, a Maryland 
court’s analysis begins with the plain language of the statute.  Dyer v. Otis Warren Real Estate 
Co., 371 Md. 576, 581, 810 A.2d 938, 941 (2002).  If the statute is unambiguous, then the court 
ends its inquiry.  Id.  In addition, the court should not construe a statute so as to “limit or extend 
its application.”  Id.  (quoting Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Chase, 360 Md. 121, 128, 
756 A.2d 987, 991 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 253.  See infra notes 267–269 and accompanying text. 
 254.  See supra note 129. 
 255.  Blackburn, 438 Md. at 111, 90 A.3d at 470 (“The Brooks court observed that this rule 
was first announced in Flaccomio v. Eysink, nearly one hundred years before the dispute here.”).  
“Stare decisis” is Latin for “to stand by things decided”; it is a legal doctrine whereby courts are 
bound to follow precedent in order to resolve subsequent cases in which similar issues are litigat-
ed.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1626 (10th ed. 2009). 
 256.  See Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n of Columbia, 432 Md. 679, 703, 69 A.3d 1149, 1163 
(2013) (Harrell, J., dissenting) (discussing policy reasons for stare decisis).  
 257.  See infra Part IV.C.1. 
 258.  See infra Part IV.C.2. 
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1.  The Blackburn Court Should Have Considered That 
Maintaining Two Inconsistent Rules Governing Claims Arising 
out of the Violation of a Statute, Ordinance, or Regulation 
Would Produce Unpredictable Results 
A hypothetical application of the Statute or Ordinance Rule and the 
Longeley rule illustrates how the Statute or Ordinance Rule can produce 
unpredictable results.  This hypothetical uses the facts and ordinance from 
Longeley.  In Longeley, a twelve-year-old boy drowned in an abandoned 
quarry that had become filled with water.259  The Baltimore City Code pro-
vision at issue in Longeley “requires each and every owner of abandoned or 
not actively operated quarries within the city limits to inclose [sic] by a 
fence, not less than six feet in heighth [sic], constructed in such manner and 
of such materials as will prevent any person from entering upon said quar-
ry.”260 
If the court applies the pre-Blackburn Statute or Ordinance Rule analy-
sis, it would first look at the plain language of the ordinance.261  The code 
provision was enacted to “prevent any person from entering upon said quar-
ry,” which, in the wake of Blackburn, appears to be too broad to satisfy the 
Statute or Ordinance Rule’s “targeted class” requirement.262  If the court 
stops its inquiry here, the Longeley rule will apply because even though the 
ordinance sets forth mandatory acts, it does not target a particular class of 
persons.  Without a pre-existing common law duty, the Longeley rule will 
not adopt the statute as the standard of care. 
If, however, the court inquires beyond the plain language of the stat-
ute, it may find that Baltimore City, in setting the six-foot height require-
ment, intended to keep children from easily climbing over the fence.263  If 
this is the case, then the ordinance would satisfy part (a) of the Statute or 
Ordinance Rule—the “targeted class” requirement.264  The boy’s drowning 
would meet the requirements of part (b) because the defendant’s failure to 
properly enclose the quarry was a proximate cause of the boy’s drown-
ing.265  Thus, the Statute or Ordinance Rule would operate to impose a duty 
on the quarry owner, which would make the owner potentially liable for the 
boy’s drowning.266 
These disparate analyses show that there are conflicting principles 
guiding how the court should determine whether a statute protects a “target-
                                                          
 259.  State v. Longeley, 161 Md. 563, 565, 158 A. 6, 6 (1932). 
 260.  Id. at 566, 158 A. at 7. 
 261.  See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 262.  See supra notes 249–250 and accompanying text. 
 263.  See supra note 177. 
 264.  See supra notes 137 & 174 and accompanying text. 
 265.  See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
 266.  See supra text accompanying note 173. 
 648 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 74:621 
ed class,” triggering the application of the Statute or Ordinance Rule.  A 
single rule with clear guidelines is necessary for two reasons.  First, without 
such guidance a court’s own policy considerations and value judgments 
may guide its interpretation of a statute, ordinance, or regulation as opposed 
to the legislature’s intent.267  Second, the General Assembly and state and 
local agencies can take the court’s rule into account when drafting legisla-
tion.268  The legislature and agencies can then craft legislation that is clearly 
intended to impose a statutory duty.269  A single rule with clear guidelines 
would thus provide for more consistent and predictable application of the 
Statute or Ordinance Rule. 
2.  The Court of Appeals Should Have Expressly Acknowledged 
That It Is Eliminating the Pre-Existing Duty Requirement for 
Negligence Claims Arising Out of a Statutory Violation By 
Overruling State v. Longeley 
The Court of Appeals erred in failing to expressly acknowledge that it 
is changing its handling of negligence claims arising out of the violation of 
a statute, ordinance, or regulation.  For all intents and purposes, the Statute 
or Ordinance Rule operates just like the rebuttable presumption form of 
negligence per se.  Both rules provide that an alleged statutory violation es-
tablishes a prima facie case of negligence, which shifts the burden of pro-
duction to the defendant to show that she was not negligent despite violat-
ing a statute.270  However, the Statute or Ordinance Rule differs from 
negligence per se in one crucial respect—it creates a duty.271  It is this as-
                                                          
 267.  Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law As Equilibrium, 108 
Harv. L. Rev. 26, 66 (1994) (noting that, in the federal context, “[t]he integrity of an interpretive 
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Paul T. Hayden & Ellen M. Bublick, THE LAW OF TORTS § 150 (2d ed.) (“A court’s acceptance or 
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 268.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 14 cmt. c (2010) (noting 
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acting safety statutes and draft a provision which directs the court that the statute should not be 
used as a basis for liability in negligence); cf. also Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 267, at 67 (dis-
cussing how, in the federal context, set rules of statutory interpretation allow legislators to better 
predict what effect courts will give statutory language). 
 269.  See Caroline Forell, Statutory Torts, Statutory Duty Actions, and Negligence Per Se: 
What’s the Difference?, 77 OR. L. REV. 497, 532–33 (1998) (discussing how the Oregon Legisla-
ture could specify when criminal statutes and regulations should provide for civil liability). 
 270.  Compare Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc., 378 Md. 79, 835 A.2d 621 (2003) (providing 
elements Statute or Ordinance Rule which establish a “prima facie case in negligence” after which 
“[t]he trier of fact must then evaluate whether the actions taken by the defendant were reasonable 
under all the circumstances”), with Bacon v. Lascelles, 678 A.2d 902, 907 (1996) (“A prima facie 
case raises a rebuttable presumption of negligence and shifts the burden of production to the party 
against whom the presumption operates.”). 
 271.  Compare Blackburn Ltd. P’ship v. Paul, 438 Md. 100, 125, 90 A.3d 464, 478–79 (2014) 
(applying Statute or Ordinance Rule to determine whether Maryland pool safety regulations create 
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pect of the rule that makes it so unpredictable.  Cases where a plaintiff’s 
claim would be dismissed because the defendant did not owe her a duty are 
now viable if the Statute or Ordinance Rule applies.272  This makes it diffi-
cult to predict when a defendant may be liable for a plaintiff’s injuries. 
There is evidence that the Brooks decision was initially intended to 
apply only to lead-paint cases.  Specifically, the Maryland Court of Special 
Appeals in Joseph v. Bozzuto Management, considered Brooks sui generis 
at least with regard to eliminating the requirement that tenants demonstrate 
that their landlord had notice of housing code violations.273  Brooks was al-
so decided when there was increasing awareness of the damaging effects of 
lead-based paint in children.274  In the 1990s and early 2000s, the General 
Assembly enacted several measures designed to detect lead paint poisoning 
in children and reduce risk of exposure.275  Thus, a rule that was probably 
originally intended to be a novel, judicial solution to landlord liability in 
lead-paint cases has since expanded to encompass other areas of the law. 
That being said, one of the ways that courts change the common law is 
through incremental modification.276  Courts create a precedent based on a 
particular set of facts—an exception to the rule.277  As new and different 
cases come before the court, it applies the precedent to different sets of 
facts.278  Slowly, the case that was once the exception becomes the rule.279  
This is the case with Brooks and its Statute or Ordinance Rule.  A rule that 
was born out of lead-paint cases is now applied more broadly—from a fed-
eral statute280 to Maryland’s sediment control regulations.281  Since Brooks 
was decided, the Court of Appeals has applied the Statute or Ordinance 
                                                          
a statutory duty), with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 14 cmt. 
i (2010) (noting that negligence per se is not duty per se).  
 272.  See, e.g., Blackburn, 438 Md. at 117, 90 A.3d at 474 (holding that the Statute or Ordi-
nance Rule applies “irrespective of a property owner’s duty to trespassers under the common 
law”). 
 273.  Joseph v. Bozzuto Mgmt. Co., 173 Md. App. 305, 341, 918 A.2d 1230, 1250 (2007). 
 274.  Cori S. Annapolen, The Court of Appeals Paints a New Canvas: Imposing Stricter Stand-
ards on Landlords to Abate Lead Paint Poisoning in Children, 64 MD. L. REV. 1268, 1275–77 
(2005). 
 275.  Id. at 1275–76. 
 276.  G. ALLAN TARR, JUDICIAL PROCESS AND JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING 295 (2d ed. 2012). 
 277.  Id. at 294.   
 278.  Id. at 294–95.   
 279.  Id. at 295; see also Jerold H. Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The Art of Overruling, 1963 
SUP. CT. REV. 211, 223 (1963) (discussing how the Supreme Court overrules cases based on the 
fact that later decisions are inconsistent with prior precedent).  
 280.  Gourdine v. Crews, 405 Md. 722, 754–55, 955 A.2d 769, 789 (2008) (Federal Food, 
Drug & Cosmetic Act). 
 281.  See supra notes 162–163 and accompanying text.  The Court of Appeals even stated that 
“the Statute or Ordinance Rule has broad applicability.”  Blackburn Ltd. P’ship v. Paul, 438 Md. 
100, 115, 90 A.3d 464, 473 (2014). 
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Rule to resolve at least eight different cases, including Blackburn.282  By 
contrast, the Longeley rule was last applied to resolve a case in 1981.283  It 
appears that over time the Longeley rule has naturally become “unsound in 
the circumstances of modern life, a vestige of the past, no longer suitable to 
our people.”284  The exception has become the rule.  The Court of Appeals 
should have expressly acknowledged that it is eliminating the pre-existing 
duty requirement285 for claims arising out of a statutory violation by over-
ruling the conflicting Longeley rule.286  Doing so would have fostered more 
consistent and predictable application of the Statute or Ordinance Rule.287 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Blackburn Limited Partnership v. Paul, the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals concluded that the Statute or Ordinance Rule can operate to impose a 
statutory duty regardless of a landowner’s limited common-law duty to 
trespassers.288  The court’s conclusion was based on a misreading of the 
Longeley rule, which led it to erroneously maintain two conflicting rules 
governing negligence claims arising out of statutory violations.289  The 
court further held that the pool safety regulations at issue in Blackburn met 
the Statute or Ordinance Rule’s “targeted class” requirement, and thus im-
posed a duty on Blackburn.290  In so holding, the court departed from previ-
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ous “targeted class” analyses, which makes it difficult to determine when a 
defendant will be civilly liable for a statutory violation.291  The court should 
have considered that clear guidelines for determining whether a statute aims 
to protect a more “targeted class” would ensure more consistent and pre-
dictable application of the Statute or Ordinance Rule.292  To further foster 
these goals, the court also should have expressly acknowledged that it is 
changing its handling negligence claims arising out of statutory viola-
tions.293 
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